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Many important activities, such as charitable giving, voting and paying taxes, are
difficult to explain by the narrow self-interest hypothesis. In a large number of laboratory
experiments, the self-interest hypothesis was rejected with respect to contributions to public
goods (e.g. John O. Ledyard, 1995). Recent theories on pro-social behavior focus on
‘conditional cooperation’: people are assumed to be more willing to contribute the more that
others contribute. This behavior may be due to various motivational reasons, such as
conformity, social norms or reciprocity. According to the theory of conditional cooperation,
higher contribution rates should be observed when information is provided that many others
contribute. This prediction is not trivial: if people behave according to pure altruism theories
(e.g. Charles Clotfelter, 1997: 34-35), they reduce their own contribution when informed that
others are already contributing.
Testing for social comparison in the field encounters many difficulties (e.g. Charles
Manski, 2000). For example, a positive correlation between expectations about the mean
behavior of the reference group and one’s own behavior is consistent with conditional
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cooperation,  but  not  conclusive,  as  causality  is  not  clear.  Behavior  may  influence
expectations, and not the other way round. Only a few laboratory experiments get around
these problems and explicitly test conditional cooperation (e.g. Urs Fischbacher et al., 2001).
These studies conclude that roughly 50 percent of the people increase their contribution if
others do so as well. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to go further and to test
conditional cooperation in a field experiment.
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Our  field  experiment  about  charitable  giving  supports  the  theory  of  conditional
cooperation: contributions increase, on average, if people know that many others contribute as
well. However, the effect varies depending on past contribution behavior. Those who never
contributed in the past do not change their behavior, while people who are indifferent about
the contributions react to the information about others’ behavior the strongest. Section I
presents the field experiment and the empirical strategy to test the hypotheses. Section II
shows the results. Section III offers concluding remarks.
I. Design of Field Experiment
Each semester, every student at the University of Zurich has to decide anonymously
whether or not he or she wants to contribute to two Social Funds – in addition to the
compulsory tuition fee. They can make a voluntary donation of CHF 7 (about US$ 4.20) to a
Fund which offers cheap loans to students in financial difficulties and/or CHF 5 (about US$
3) to a Fund supporting foreign students, or they can choose not to donate to either fund.
Students decide anonymously at home about the contribution to the two Social Funds.
                                                   
1 A number of results of laboratory experiments are consistent with ‘conditional cooperation’ (e.g. Claudia Keser
and Frans van Winden, 2000). James Andreoni and John Karl Scholz (1998) find in a field study that if
contributions of the people in one’s social reference group increase by an average of 10%, then one’s own
contribution rises by about 2% to 3%. In a somewhat related field experiment, John List and David Lucking-
Reiley (2002) exogenously increased the ‘seed money’ in a donation campaign, which can be interpreted as the
donations by others, from 10% to 67%; as a result donations increased by a factor of six.3
The panel data includes the decisions of all 37,624 students over nine semesters. For the
field experiment, 2,500 students of the student population (non-freshmen) were selected at
random. The University administration provided 2,000 of them with differing information
about the behavior of other students. All other non-freshmen constitute the control group.
1,000 students were given the information that a relatively high percentage of the student
population (64 percent) contributed to the two Funds in the past (treatment ‘High’), and a
further 1,000 students that a relatively low percentage (46 percent) contributed to the two
Funds (treatment ‘Low’). We did not deceive students by giving fictitious data: the higher
percentage applies to the last winter semester contributions while the lower percentage
indicates the average contribution over the last ten years. As some of the subjects did not
renew their registration, we observe somewhat less than 1,000 subjects in each treatment
group.
In a third treatment group, expectations about the behavior of others were elicited for a
group of 500 students by asking them to guess what percentage of the total student population
contributed to both of the Funds. There were monetary incentives for the students to give their
best guesses. 258 made guesses (out of the 431 students in this treatment group who decided
to renew their registration). This constitutes a return rate of 58 percent.
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The design of the field experiment has two clear advantages over previous studies. First,
while experimental research in laboratories leads to many insights about human behavior, it is
still unclear exactly how these results can be generalized outside of the laboratory situation.
Our field experiment enables this gap to be narrowed down, while still controlling for relevant
variables. Second, the panel structure of the data set allows an analysis of how people with
heterogeneous pro-social preferences identified from past behavior react to social comparison.
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II. Analysis and Results
We report the results in three steps. Firstly, the relationship between expectations and
behavior is presented. Secondly, we report the effect of the field experiment and compare the
magnitude  of  the  effect  with  the  correlation  between  expectations  and  willingness  to
contribute. Thirdly, we analyze whether the treatment effect differs for heterogeneous people.
We observe that the higher the expectation of the students about the average group
behavior, the more likely it is that they contribute. Students expect, on average, 57 percent of
their fellow students to contribute to both Social Funds. They underestimate the actual
contribution  rate  of  67  percent.  The  coefficient  of  correlation  between  the  expressed
expectations  and  the  contribution  to  at  least  one  Fund  is  0.34  (p<0.001).  This  result
corresponds with the results of many laboratory studies. From this result, however, causality
cannot be established, because behavior can also influence expectations, e.g. through a ‘false
consensus’ effect (e.g. Lee Ross et al., 1977). It is therefore important to experimentally
induce  beliefs:  How  do  individuals  react  when  faced  with  the  relatively high or low
contribution rate of other people?
The results of the field experiment are consistent with the hypothesis that people are
partly driven by conditional cooperation: the probability of students contributing correlates
positively with the mean contribution rate in the reference group. The percentage of students
contributing to at least one of the Funds increases by more than 2.3 percentage points when
they receive the information that 64 percent of the other students contribute, compared to the
information that only 46 percent contribute (the contribution rates being 74.7 percent for
treatment ‘Low’, 77.0 percent for treatment ‘High’, and 72.9 percent for the control group).
This difference between the two treatments is not statistically significant at any conventional
level (t-value=1.199, p<0.231). However, such a result may be due to heterogeneity in
people’s  preferences.  Some  students  derive  high  utility  from  contributing  and  others5
presumably would get disutility if they had to contribute. As the decision is censored to either
contributing or not contributing, those who always gave or never gave should not be that
much affected by social comparison. Students whose utility gain is somewhere between the
two extremes should be more likely to respond. To control for such individual heterogeneity,
we estimate a conditional logit model with individual fixed-effects. The average effect,
therefore, is not very representative and its estimation comes with a large standard error.
Table 1 presents the conditional logit model, where the dependent variable takes the
value 1 when the subject decides to contribute to at least one Fund, and 0 otherwise.
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Individual fixed-effects and time dummies are incorporated. The control group consists of all
non-freshmen not in the treatment groups. This model tests the effect on contributions of
being in one of the two treatment groups and, more importantly, whether there are differences
between the two treatments groups.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 supports ‘conditional cooperation’: people presented with a high contribution
rate are more likely to contribute than people who are told that not so many others contribute
to the Funds. The difference between the two coefficients for the two treatment groups is
statistically significant at the 95-percent level (χ
2(1) = 5.44, p<0.0197). The effect on
behavior is substantial, especially if the specific features of the naturally occurring decision
setting  are  considered.  Firstly,  as  the  experimental  intervention  is  based  on  actual
contribution rates, we do not provide information about very high or very low cooperation
rates. The difference between 46 percent and 64 percent of students contributing is relatively
modest compared to previous laboratory studies where people are confronted with extreme
cases, such as zero contribution rates (e.g. Joachim Weimann, 1994). Our results can be seen
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as providing even stronger support for ‘conditional cooperation’. Secondly, the students face
a dichotomous decision of whether to contribute or not. This leaves little room for marginally
adjusting one’s behavior. Again, it is remarkable that students change their behavior at all.
Thus, the results from the field experiment show that, even in a naturally occurring situation,
people react to relatively small changes in the reported cooperation rate of others.
In order to estimate the magnitude of the effect, we test the treatment effect in a probit
model, controlling for past behavior as a proxy for heterogeneity of persons. The coefficient
of past behavior indicates the fraction of previous situations in which the subject decided to
contribute. More than 50 percent of the students contributed in all previous decisions. Around
10 percent never contributed to either of the two Funds. The rest fall somewhere in between.
The probit model of Table 2 incorporates only students who are the subjects of one of the two
treatment groups. Treatment ‘Low’ constitutes the reference group. The computed marginal
effect shows how much the probability of a contribution changes compared to the reference
group.
[Table 2 about here]
The results of panel A confirm that individuals contribute more to the two Funds when
they know that many others do so as well (p<0.01). The marginal effect of 4.6 percentage
points is large when taking into account that the intervention is not strong. Table 2 also shows
that past behavior is indeed an important determinant of present behavior and may capture the
heterogeneous preferences towards contributing to the Funds.
It is possible to compare the behavioral effect due to the experimentally induced
cooperation standards of 46 percent and 64 percent, with the behavioral effect of a change in
reported expectations of the same magnitude. Panel B shows the probit model with the
elicited beliefs incorporated as an independent variable. As the marginal effect of a one-
percentage change in expectations is 0.006, the change from 46 percent to 64 percent changes7
the probability of contributing by around 11.5 percentage points. This effect is more than
twice the behavioral change actually occurring due to conditional cooperation. The correlation
between elicited expectations and behavior therefore greatly overestimates the effect of
‘conditional cooperation’. This can be explained by a ‘false consensus’ effect: Individuals’
preferences on contribution may influence expectations about the pro-social behavior of
others. Panel C of Table 2 controls for individual heterogeneity by incorporating the
coefficient of past behavior in the probit model. The marginal effect of a one-percentage
change in expectations is 0.003. A change in expectations from 46 percent to 64 percent
corresponds to a change in the probability of contributing by around 5.3 percentage points.
This effect is more in line with the behavioral change due to induced beliefs, because the
coefficient of past behavior captures part of the ‘false consensus’ effect.
The question can be asked whether people with different preferences for pro-social
behavior react differently to the treatments. Figure 1 analyzes whether the treatment effect
interacts with past behavior. Subjects who never contributed (c=0) or always contributed
(c=1) are quite insensitive to the treatments. In contrast, subjects who changed their behavior
in the past pay more attention to other people’s behavior.
 4 The higher sensitivity is consistent
with a model where people have heterogeneous preferences. As the decision is censored,
people who have strong (weak) pro-social preferences are not able to further increase
(decrease)  their  contribution.  People  who  are  more  indifferent  to  contributing  or  not
contributing react the most to the information about cooperation rates in the field experiment.
[Figure 1 about here]
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III. Discussion and Conclusion
This  paper  presents  evidence  from  a  large-scale  field  experiment  on  conditional
cooperation: people behave pro-socially conditional on the pro-social behavior of other
persons. When students were presented with the information that many others donated to two
Social Funds at the University of Zurich, their willingness to contribute increased compared
to  the  situation  where  they  were  informed  that  not  so  many  others  contributed.  This
constitutes a first test of social interaction effects in charitable giving in a field experiment.
The behavior resulting from conditional cooperation is consistent with at least three
theoretical approaches: firstly, people may want to behave in an appropriate way and to
conform to a social norm (e.g. David Messick, 1999); secondly, people have some sort of
fairness preferences, such as reciprocity (e.g. Matthew Rabin, 1993); or thirdly, contributions
by others may serve as a signal for the quality of the public good, or for the organization
which provides the good (e.g. a charity) (e.g. Lise Vesterlund, 2003). The results of the field
experiment do not inform us as to which theoretical approach is the most appropriate for
explaining conditional cooperation. Results from previous experiments that try to discriminate
between the various explanations are ambiguous. Some experimental studies indicate that
conformity can explain conditional cooperation better than reciprocal considerations (e.g. Iris
Bohnet and Richard Zeckhauser, 2002), while others come to the opposite conclusion (e.g.
Armin Falk et al., 2003; Robert Kurzban et al., 2001). Yet other laboratory experiments find
evidence for the third mechanism that cooperative behavior of others is used as a signal for
the quality of the public good (Jan Potters et al., 2001). Future research should concentrate on
testing in the field under which conditions the motives that lead to conditional cooperation
prevail.9
References
Andreoni, James and John Karl Scholz. “An Econometric Analysis of Charitable Giving
with Interdependent Preferences.” Economic Inquiry, 1998, 36(3), pp. 410-28.
Bohnet, Iris and Richard Zeckhauser. “Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining.”
Working Paper Series, Harvard University, 2002.
Clotfelter, Charles T. “The Economics of Giving.” in Barry, John W. and Bruno V. Manno,
eds.,  Giving  Better,  Giving  Smarter.  Washington,  D.C.:  National  Commission  on
Philanthropy and Civic Renewal, 1997, pp. 31-55.
Falk, Armin, Urs Fischbacher and Simon Gächter. “Living in Two Neighborhoods –
Social Interactions in the Lab.” Working Paper Series No. 150, University of Zurich, 2003.
Fischbacher,  Urs,  Simon  Gächter  and  Ernst  Fehr.  “Are  People  Conditionally
Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment.” Economics Letters, 2001, 71(3),
pp. 397-404.
Frey, Bruno S. and Stephan Meier. “Social Comparisons and Pro-Social Behavior: Testing
'Conditional  Cooperation'  in  a  Field  Experiment.”  Working  Paper  Series  No.  162,
University of Zurich, 2003.
Keser,  Claudia  and  Frans  van  Winden.  “Conditional  Cooperation  and  Voluntary
Contributions to Public Goods.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2000, 102(1), pp.
23-39.
Kurzban, Robert, Kevin McCabe, Vernon L. Smith and Bart J. Wilson. “Incremental
Commitment and Reciprocity in a Real-Time Public Goods Game.” Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 2001, 27(12), pp. 1662-73.
Ledyard, John O. “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” in Kagel, John and
Alvin E. Roth, eds., Handbook  of  Experimental  Economics.  Princeton:  Princeton
University Press, 1995, pp. 111-94.
List, John A. and David Lucking-Reiley. “The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on
Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign.” Journal
of Political Economy, 2002, 110(1), pp. 215-33.
Manski,  Charles.  “Economic  Analysis  of  Social  Interactions.”  Journal  of  Economic
Perspectives, 2000, 14(3), pp. 115-36.
Messick, David M. “Alternative Logics for Decision Making in Social Settings.” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 1999, 39(1), pp. 11-28.
Potters,  Jan,  Martin  Sefton  and  Lise  Vesterlund.  “Why  Announce  Leadership
Contributions? An Experimental Study of the Signaling and Reciprocity Hypothesis.”
Working Paper, Tilburg University, 2001.
Rabin, Matthew. “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.” American
Economic Review, 1993, 83(5), pp. 1281-302.
Ross, Lee, David Greene and Pamela House. “The 'False Consensus Effect': An Egocentric
Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes.” Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 1977, 13, pp. 279-301.
Vesterlund, Lise. “The Informational Value of Sequential Fundraising.” Journal of Public
Economics, 2003, 87(3-4), pp. 627-657.
Weimann, Joachim. “Individual Behaviour in a Free Riding Experiment.” Journal of Public
Economics, 1994, 54(2), pp. 185-200.10
Table 1: Conditional Cooperation
Dichotomous dependent variable: Contribution to at least one Fund (=1)




Treatment ‘High’ (64%) 0.363**
(2.73)
0.006
Treatment ‘Low’ (46%) -0.063
(-0.48)
0.633




Notes:  Test of differences for treatment ‘High’ - ‘Low’ = 0.0:
χ
2(1) = 5.44, p< 0.0197
Level of significance: * 0.01<p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Table 2: Conditional Cooperation Controlling for Past Behavior
Dichotomous dependent variable: Contribution to at least one Fund (=1)
Probit estimate













Treatment ‘High’ (64%) 0.180**
(2.20)
4.6%



















N 1754 250 250
Log likelihood -594.28409 -122.02608 -70.236785





























































Figure 1: Different reactions to others' behavior